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[A] body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody, ought not to be 
trusted by any body.1
 Since the burst of the high-tech bubble in the late 1990s, advancements in 
corporate governance have often followed highly publicized failures in corporate 
oversight and accountability.2 The popping of the tech bubble, the dramatic Enron 
and WorldCom failures of the early 2000s, and the recession beginning in 2008 
revealed major issues in corporate accountability, ushering in heightened compliance, 
accounting, and auditing standards.3 Congress passed significant laws pertaining to 
corporate governance reform in 20024 and 2010,5 heightening standards and 
establishing new duties of oversight for public company directors.6 With the hope of 
rebuilding investor confidence, these acts sought to tighten corporate compliance 
and strengthen risk management controls after scandal and reckless decisionmaking 
led to massive losses for shareholders.7
 Regulators quickly focused their attention on compliance controls to hold 
corporations accountable for actions that damage the integrity of American industry.8 
Investigations, enforcement actions, and settlements under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA)9 have risen dramatically since 2007, with record amounts of 
dollars being paid in fines and dozens of punishments served.10 In 2010, the Securities 
1. Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French 
Revolution 63 (Peter Eckler 1892) (1792).
2. Grant Kirkpatrick, Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, OECD J.: Fin. Mkt. Trends, 
no. 1, 2009, at 61, 63. 
3. Id.
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”). 
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (“To promote the financial stability of 
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system [and] . . . to 
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices . . . .”).
6. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale 
L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005); Edolphus Towns, On the Dodd-Frank Act, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. vii, vii–ix 
(2011); J. Brent Wilkins, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects of Restoring Shareholder 
Confidence, 29 S. Ill. U. L.J. 339, 340 (2005).
7. See Romano, supra note 6, at 1538. 
8. Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Related Corporate 
Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & 
Bus. 303, 305 (1998) (examining renewed interest in pursuing civil and criminal enforcement of the 
FCPA).
9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to make it unlawful for 
an issuer of securities . . . to make certain payments to foreign officials and other foreign persons . . . .”).
10. Cherie O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, Currents: Int’l Trade L.J., Winter 
2008, at 3, 3.
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and Exchange Commission (SEC) successfully created a specialized unit to combat 
multinational companies violating the FCPA.11
 The heightened scrutiny and focus on compliance has influenced the market on 
the grounds that certain companies are now less willing to engage in transactions 
that would bring them under the FCPA’s jurisdiction.12 The mere disclosure of a 
potential violation can send shareholders scrambling and stock prices plummeting.13 
Too often, shareholders have seen their investments used to pay legal fees and settle 
outrageous fines, instead of awarding dividends.14 Potential violations of the FCPA 
not only put businesses at risk but also directly impact shareholders.
 Unfortunately, shareholders have limited options in holding directors accountable. 
Shareholder derivative litigation is a mechanism that allows the court to serve as a 
forum for shareholders seeking to hold directors responsible for alleged harm to the 
corporation.15 Shareholders file suit and step into the shoes of the corporation against 
the board or adverse actor.16 Proceeds of a successful action are awarded back to the 
corporation instead of the shareholders as a means of enforcing fiduciary obligations.17 
Because this form of legal action brings business decisions into the courthouse, 
plaintiffs in shareholder derivative litigation face many hurdles, including the “demand” 
requirement under Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18 This rule 
requires shareholders to state whether they made a demand for action prior to filing 
suit,19 or more commonly, why making such a demand prior to litigation would have 
been futile or ineffective (“demand futility”).20 Plaintiffs who fail to establish a prior 
11. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/
spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last modified Oct. 5, 2015).
12. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Int’l Bus. Transactions, The FCPA and its Impact on 
International Business Transactions—Should Anything Be Done to Minimize the 
Consequences of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore Corruption? 1 (2011), 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpactonInternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf.
13. See H. David Kotz & Susan M. Mangiero, Avoiding FCPA Liability by Tightening Internal 
Controls 1–2 (2014), http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/494_Kotz_Mangiero_CorpCounselor_
Sept2014_text.pdf.
14. See id.; Baker Hughes Incorporated and Roy Fearnley: Lit. Rel. No. 20094, U.S. Sec. & Exchange 
Commission (April 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm (discussing 
the amount of fines that Baker Hughes must pay for violations of FCPA); Baker Hughes Inc., Quarterly 
Report (Form 10-Q ) 13, 21 (July 30, 2007) (discussing the fine charges against Baker Hughes and the 
reduction of the dividend because of lower cash on hand).
15. Deborah A. DeMott & David F. Cavers, Shareholder Derivative Actions: Law and 
Practice § 1:1 (2014–2015).
16. Jeffrey D. Bauman & Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Corporations Law and Policy: Materials 
and Problems 705 (8th ed. 2013).
17. See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 
746 (1960). 
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
19. Id. at 23.1(b)(3)(A).
20. Id. at 23.1(b)(3)(B).
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demand for action or demand futility in the complaint are barred from bringing a 
claim.21 Most commonly, a demand for action can be established by raising the issue at 
a shareholders meeting, sending a demand letter to the board, or following any 
procedure for demand that may be included in the charter of the corporation. Proving 
demand futility presents an ever-increasing burden on the shareholders, leaving many 
investors locked out of both the boardroom and the courthouse.
 In order to pass this initial hurdle under Rule 23.1, Nevada courts apply the legal 
standard from Aronson v. Lewis.22 Plaintiffs may show demand futility either (1) by 
stating with particularity facts showing that the directors are not independent in 
their duties or disinterested in the transaction or (2) by rebutting the presumption 
that the transaction was a valid exercise of business judgment.23 For the second prong 
of Aronson—the business judgment rule presumption—the plaintiffs at the pleading 
stage must allege “facts sufficient to raise (1) a reason to doubt that the action was 
taken honestly and in good faith or (2) a reason to doubt that the board was adequately 
informed in making the decision.”24
 In Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Wynn, the District 
Court for the District of Nevada examined whether a group of Wynn Resorts 
shareholders, consisting mostly of pension and retirement funds, could bring a 
derivative action against the directors of Wynn Resorts for approving a corporate 
donation that carried a significant compliance risk.25 The court, in granting the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, held that the plaintiffs did not meet the heightened 
pleading standard to create a reasonable doubt as to the underlying transaction and 
failed to rebut the business judgment rule presumption.26
 This case comment contends that the Wynn court’s interpretation of the business 
judgment rule presumption improperly bars shareholders from redress within the 
courthouse and the boardroom for two reasons. First, the court applied an improperly 
narrow analysis of the good faith element of the business judgment rule presumption. 
Second, the court severely weakened the duty of directors to act on an informed 
basis. The court’s ruling in Wynn sets an unclear precedent that harms corporate 
21. Andrew S. Hirsch, Dismissing Derivative Actions in the Federal Courts for Failure to Allege Demand 
Futility: Choosing a Standard of Appellate Review—Abuse of Discretion or De Novo?, 64 Emory L.J. 201, 
203 (2014).
22. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 2000). The Nevada Supreme Court has stated “[t]he Delaware court’s approach is a 
well-reasoned method for analyzing demand futility and is highly applicable in the context of Nevada’s 
corporations law.” Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1184 (Nev. 2006) (following Aronson, 
473 A.2d at 812); see also In re Amerco Derivative Litig., 252 P.3d 681 (Nev. 2011).
23. In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S’holder Litig., 906 A.2d 808, 820 (Del. Ch. 2005). “These prongs are 
in the disjunctive, and therefore, ‘if either prong is satisfied, demand is excused.’” La. Mun. Police 
Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 
2014) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 254, 256 (Del. 2000)).
24. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003).
25. 2014 WL 994616, at *1.
26. Id. at *9.
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governance reform and diminishes shareholders’ ability to hold directors accountable 
for risky behavior.
 The history of Macau, and the growth of its gaming industry, is crucial to 
understanding the transaction at the heart of Wynn. In 1999, the People’s Republic of 
China assumed formal sovereignty over Macau.27 Along with Hong Kong, Macau 
was established as a Special Administrative Region in which the Chinese government 
granted special economic rules and policies to foster growth.28 Macau quickly began 
constructing new hotels and attractions as a way of building tourism.29 Shortly 
thereafter, casino magnates and corporations, including Wynn Resorts, descended on 
Macau with the intention of creating the Las Vegas of the East.30 Wynn Resorts is led 
by business mogul Stephen A. Wynn (“S. Wynn”),31 who has been called the “King of 
Las Vegas”32 for his work in building one of the world’s largest casino, hospitality, and 
tourism groups.33 In 2006, Wynn Resorts opened the doors to its first hotel and 
casino in Macau under a land concession agreement provided by the Macau 
government.34 After opening the first casino, the company announced that it had 
submitted an application with the Macau government for a second land concession 
agreement.35 This time, Wynn Resorts planned to build a new casino resort on the 
27. Macau Handover: Asia’s Last Colony, BBC News (Dec. 20, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/564984.stm.
28. Joe Havely, What Now for Macau? BBC News (Dec. 20, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/566074.stm.
29. Macao Gaming History, Gaming Inspection & Coordination Bureau, Macao, http://www.dicj.gov.
mo/web/en/history/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
30. Macau had always been friendly to the gambling industry, but under new rule, the dream of building a 
true “Vegas of the East” to serve the Asian market became a reality. See id.
31. Stephen A. Wynn is Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Wynn Resorts. The 
company’s corporate profile provides that:
[p]rior to founding Wynn Resorts, Mr. Wynn was Chairman of the Board, President 
and Chief Executive Officer of Mirage Resorts, Incorporated and its predecessor from 
1973 to 2000. In that role, he was responsible for the development of Bellagio, The 
Mirage, Treasure Island at The Mirage and the Golden Nugget in Las Vegas, Nevada 
as well as the Atlantic City Golden Nugget in New Jersey and Beau Rivage in Biloxi, 
Mississippi.
 Corporate Profile, Wynn Resorts, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=132059&p=irol-
homeProfile&t=&id=& (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
32. This title has been used, for both good and bad, in biographies, e.g., John L. Smith, Running Scared: 
The Life and Treacherous Times of Las Vegas Casino King Steve Wynn 21–22 (2001), general 
publications, e.g., Nina Munk, Steve Wynn’s Biggest Gamble, Vanity Fair, June 2005, http://www.
vanityfair.com/society/features/2005/06/steve-wynn-las-vegas-resort, and profiles, e.g., 60 Minutes 
(CBS television broadcast Apr. 12, 2009). 
33. Munk, supra note 32.
34. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *1 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 13, 2014). A land concession agreement is used by a government or local authority to transfer 
rights to a new entity, such as a corporation.
35. Id.
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lucrative Cotai Strip.36 The new development would be twice the size of Wynn 
Resorts’ first Macau casino and located in a highly competitive area where rival 
investment groups build resorts to outperform the success of the Las Vegas Strip.37
 After five years of waiting on the application, the company had still not received 
approval for the multi-billion dollar development on the Cotai Strip.38 In 2011, 
eleven of the twelve members of Wynn Resorts’ board of directors approved an 
unprecedented $135 million donation to the University of Macau’s development 
foundation.39 The donation consisted of a $25 million charitable transfer made 
immediately, and a commitment to make additional transfers of $10 million per year 
from 2012 to 2022.40 The donation amounted to approximately seventy per cent of 
the University’s endowment.41 Conveniently for Wynn Resorts, the University of 
Macau’s chancellor also held the highest seat of power in the Macau government.42 A 
month after announcing the donation, the Macau government finally approved the 
second land concession agreement.43 At the time of the donation, only S. Wynn 
sought a legal opinion sanctioning the transaction; no other board members sought 
legal counsel leading up to the decision.44 The only board member who voted against 
the transaction was Wynn Resorts’ co-founder, Kazuo Okada, who requested to see 
the legal opinion45 but was shortly removed from the board as an “unsuitable 
shareholder” following his disapproval of the pledged donation.46
36. See Vinicy Chan, Wynn Macau Gets Land Grant for Casino on Cotai Strip, Bloomberg Bus. (May 2, 
2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-02/wynn-macau-gets-land-approval-for-
casino-on-cotai-gambling-strip.html. The Cotai Strip is an area of land adjacent to the designated area 
where the first casinos were built following the handover. However, the Cotai Strip better resembles the 
Las Vegas Strip because of the ability to walk between resorts freely in a seemingly isolated ecosystem. 
Id.
37. See id. 
38. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1. 
39. Id. 
40. Id.
41. Verified First Amended Consolidated Derivative Complaint ¶ 6, La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. 




44. Id. ¶ 159; see also Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *9.
45. Verified Complaint, supra note 41, ¶ 159; Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1–2.
46. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *2. Despite Okada’s help in co-founding Wynn Resorts with S. Wynn and 
helping secure the success of the company’s prior casinos and resorts, this case comment will not 
examine the continued battle between Okada, Wynn Resorts, and S. Wynn. Okada helped found 
Wynn Resorts by financing S. Wynn’s operations following his departure from Mirage Resorts. The 
court in Wynn declared that the board’s decision to oust Okada as an unsuitable shareholder was within 
the board’s power as governed by the company’s Articles of Incorporation. Id. at *9. This led to a drastic 
falling out between Wynn Resorts and Okada. See Mike Koehler, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples, 
3 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 391, 446–49 (2014).
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 In February 2012, the SEC’s Enforcement Division notified Wynn Resorts that 
it had begun an informal inquiry into the Macau donation.47 The SEC has the 
authority to investigate publicly traded companies for activities that potentially harm 
investors.48 In February 2013, the Nevada Gaming Control Board announced its 
own investigation into the donation but found no violations at the time.49
 In March 2012, shortly after the SEC announced its investigation, a group of 
Wynn Resorts shareholders brought a derivative suit against the eleven directors who 
voted to approve the donation.50 The shareholders alleged breach of fiduciary duty, 
waste of corporate assets, and unjust enrichment, and sought a permanent injunction 
against the board for its approval of the donation.51 The plaintiffs’ theory of the case 
alleged that the Macau donation represented an improper attempt to influence the 
Macau government to speed up approval of the second land concession agreement, 
which had been pending for five years.52 The defendants first moved to dismiss in 
September 2012;53 the court granted this motion as well as the plaintiffs’ motion to 
amend the complaint.54 The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint in 
May 2013.55 After deliberations, the District Court for the District of Nevada, Judge 
James Mahan presiding, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice.56 
The judgment in favor of defendants was entered on March 13, 2014.
 The court in Wynn improperly narrowed the business judgment rule presumption 
as applied in a shareholder derivative suit in two ways. First, the court failed to 
properly examine the good faith element. Second, the court severely weakened the 
duty of directors to act on an informed basis. The court’s ruling weakens corporate 
governance reform by undermining the importance of compliance and reduces the 
shareholders’ ability to hold directors accountable.
 First, the court’s analysis of the good faith element was improperly demanding 
and will lead to dangerous results for shareholders. In order to rebut the business 
47. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1.
48. Investor Bulletin: SEC Investigations, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.
sec.gov/enforce/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_investigations.html#.VN4eM7dOVl8.
49. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1.
50. The eleven director defendants who voted to approve the transaction are as follows: S. Wynn, Linda 
Chen, Russell Goldsmith, Ray R. Irani, Robert J. Miller, John A. Moran, Mark D. Schorr, Alvin V. 
Shoemaker, D. Boone Wayson, Elaine P. Wynn, and Allen Zeman. Id.
51. Id. at *2.
52. Id. at *1. 
53. Motion to Dismiss, La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-cv-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 
WL 994616 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2014), 2012 WL 7987171.
54. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2013 WL 431339 (D. Nev. 
Feb. 1, 2013). 
55. Motion to Dismiss First Amended Consolidated Derivative Complaint, La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. 
Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2014), 2013 WL 
9744135.
56. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *9. 
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judgment rule presumption, plaintiffs must allege, with sufficient facts, a reason to 
doubt that the action was made honestly and in good faith.57 The court must identify 
whether the plaintiff has articulated a reasonable basis to be entrusted with a claim 
that belongs to the corporation before the plaintiff can proceed with discovery and 
trial, if necessary.58 The court in Wynn, however, stated that “[a]t most, the [plaintiffs’] 
complaint alleges that defendants knew the donation was made in an effort to obtain 
the land concession” but that “this does not demonstrate bad faith on behalf of the 
directors.”59 The court held that the business judgment rule presumption protected 
the directors because the plaintiffs had not alleged that “the donation was made to 
advance some interest other than the company’s welfare or that the directors had 
knowledge of the violation of the law.”60 This ruling not only goes against prior case 
law but also undercuts the duty upon directors to act in good faith.
 The District Court should have analyzed the good faith element under the 
precedent established in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation61 
because the directors failed to exercise a reasonable effort to monitor compliance 
risk.62 In Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated that the failure of a 
board to exercise compliance oversight will establish a lack of necessary good faith 
and rebut the business judgment rule presumption.63 In Wynn, the Macau donation 
was not a business transaction in the traditional sense because it was a corporate 
donation bearing significant risk of violating the FCPA and the board’s fiduciary 
duties to shareholders.64 Accordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that the directors 
breached their fiduciary duties of oversight, care, and loyalty by approving the 
donation at the expense of compliance with the law.65
 Stone v. Ritter, one of Caremark ’s progeny, further established the relationship 
between a director’s duty of oversight and the good faith requirement.66 In Stone, the 
Delaware Supreme Court examined a derivative action brought against a bank for its 
57. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003).
58. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000) (holding that shareholder claims at the pleading 
stage must demonstrate particularized facts and be “simple, concise and direct”).
59. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *8. 
60. Id.
61. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk 
Management, 34 Iowa J. Corp. L. 967, 968 (2009) (“Shareholder suits bringing such claims principally 
implicate the analysis of oversight failures by the board of directors, as established by the Caremark 
decision and its progeny.”).
62. See Gabriela Jara, Note, Following on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Dynamic Shareholder 
Derivative Suit, 63 Duke L.J. 199, 203 (2013) (“The liability underlying an FCPA follow-on derivative 
suit is premised on a Caremark claim.”); see also Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
63. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
64. See Jara, supra note 62, 205–07. 
65. See Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *2, *8.
66. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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failure to maintain a compliance program to oversee money-laundering violations.67 
The Stone court recognized that good faith, in the context of the duty of oversight, 
requires a reasonable effort by the directors to steer clear of “red f lags” that would 
alert their attention to particular forms of risk.68
 The defendants in Wynn were faced with many red f lags which would support a 
reasonable inference of a compliance risk.69 First, given the recent trends in U.S. 
enforcement efforts, no company conducting business abroad can afford to ignore the 
FCPA or the duty of directors in implementing effective compliance oversight.70 
Delaware courts regularly analyze the good faith element within the context of the 
company’s industry.71 The casino and gaming industry has long been scrutinized for 
its connections to money laundering, organized crime, corruption, and bribery.72 At 
the time the board made its decision, it was also likely on notice that the company’s 
biggest competitor, the Las Vegas Sands, was being investigated for similar FCPA 
violations in Macau.73 Beyond the industry, the Wynn court neglected to examine 
factors that past courts have used to establish reasonable doubt. These include not 
only examining the transaction in the context of the defendant’s industry, but also 
examining the size, timing, and probable harm that the transaction might cause to 
shareholders.
 In Metro Communication Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Technologies, Inc., the 
Delaware Chancery Court held that a plan to bribe foreign officials in order to 
obtain permits constituted a breach of fiduciary duty.74 The bribe was in connection 
with the then-recently deregulated Brazilian telecommunications industry.75 Roughly 
$31 million in payments were made through a bribery scheme that would grant the 
67. Id. at 365.
68. See id. at 373.
69. See Bainbridge, supra note 61, at 988 (“[R]ed f lags involving illegal behavior or accounting irregularities 
are more likely to result in liability than risk management failures.”); see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“There are significant differences between 
failing to oversee employee fraudulent or criminal conduct and failing to recognize the extent of a 
Company’s business risk.”).
70. Taylor, supra note 10, at 3. 
71. See, e.g., In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430–VCS., 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 (Del. Ch. May 31, 
2011).
72. See Fin. Action Task Force, Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector (March 2009), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Vulnerabilities%20of%20Casinos%20and%20
Gaming%20Sector.pdf. 
73. See, e.g., Joel Rosenblatt, Las Vegas Sands, Adelson Face $5 Billion Macau Plan Suit, Bloomberg Bus. 
(July 13, 2014, 1:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-11/las-vegas-sands-sued-for-5-
billion-over-trade-secrets.html (detailing litigation concerning corruption in Macau tied to Las Vegas 
Sands for activities that were highly scrutinized amongst regulators, industry insiders, and anxious 
shareholders).
74. 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
75. Id. at 129–30. 
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defendants work authorizations for certain employees in Brazil.76 The scandal was 
uncovered by the local media and led to an investigation by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) under the FCPA.77 The court looked to relevant factors such as the industry 
and the size and timing of the transactions in determining that the defendants 
breached their fiduciary duty by pursuing work authorizations at the expense of 
compliance with the law.78
 Additionally, in In re Massey Energy Co., shareholders of a controversial coal 
mining corporation brought a claim against the directors for failing to make a good 
faith effort to comply with mine safety regulations.79 Shareholders brought the suit 
following a mine explosion in West Virginia that killed twenty-nine workers and 
injured many others.80 The court applied intense scrutiny to the directors’ decisions 
based primarily on the industry in which the company operated.81 The court 
recognized the plaintiffs’ argument that the coal mining company pursued profits at 
the expense of compliance with the law.82
 The Wynn court should have taken into account both the timing of the transaction 
and its unprecedented size as relevant factors. Perhaps the most suspicious element of 
the donation was that it came at a crucial time in the application process and led to 
the approval of the land concession by the Macau government two months later.83 
The size of the donation raises doubt as it amounted to approximately seventy per cent 
of the university’s endowment, an unprecedented figure in the history of both Wynn 
Resorts and the university.84 Furthermore, the court should have scrutinized the 
transaction more closely because of the high-risk nature of the gambling industry in 
Macau.85 Much like the coal mining industry in Massey, the gambling industry has a 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 130, 135.
78. See id. at 132–37. 
79. C.A. No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011). 
80. Id. at *1.
81. See id. at *19–21. 
82. Id. 
83. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *8 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 13, 2014).
84. Verified Complaint, supra note 41, ¶ 6.
85. The gambling industry in Macau has long been tainted and scrutinized as a playground for corruption. 
See, e.g., Vinicy Chan, Macau Casinos Decline After Report on Junket Crackdown, Bloomberg Bus. (Feb. 
6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-06/galaxy-leads-macau-casino-drop-on-report-
of-junket-curbs.html (discussing corruption in Macau tied to the gaming industry); Kate O’Keeffe, 
Wary High-Rollers Shy Away From Macau’s Casinos, Wall St. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://online.
wsj.com/articles/macau-gambling-revenue-drops-again-1406871798; cf. Jorge Godinho, Casino Gaming 
in Macau: Evolution, Regulation and Challenges, 5 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1 (2014) (discussing current 
problems in Macau and changes implemented by the Macau and Chinese governments to tackle issues 
moving forward); Rosenblatt, supra note 73.
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well-known history of corruption, bribery, and organized crime.86 Likewise, the 
directors acted similarly to the board in Massey by exposing the company to significant 
compliance risks in the pursuit of profits. The board’s failure to minimize exposure to 
regulatory risk harmed both the corporation and its shareholders and created a valid 
reason to doubt that the action was made in good faith.
 Additionally, the Wynn court failed to incorporate the then-ongoing investigations 
as a factor that might rebut the business judgment rule presumption. When examining 
the plausibility of the plaintiff ’s allegations, many courts have stated that a pending 
government investigation into alleged misconduct supports the inference that the 
defendants acted with knowledge that their decision was wrongful.87 Past precedent 
has included inquiries and investigations by the SEC and similar regulators.88 The 
court’s refusal to weigh the then-ongoing investigations by the SEC, DOJ, and 
Nevada gaming authorities not only goes against precedent but also serves to 
undermine the work of these agencies in protecting shareholders. The court should 
have incorporated the then-ongoing investigations as a factor in favor of the plaintiffs’ 
claims that the decision was not a valid exercise of business judgment.
 Furthermore, the court ultimately failed to properly analyze the good faith 
element of the directors’ decision that was approved at the expense of compliance 
with the law. The Wynn court stated that the defendants did not act in bad faith by 
approving the donation as an effort to obtain the land concession.89 The court stated 
that the plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden to rebut the presumption absent 
a showing that the donation was made to advance some interest other than the 
company’s welfare.90
 In Wynn, the directors’ decision was not a bona fide charitable donation because 
it was made in the interests of obtaining the second land concession agreement with 
no regard for legal consequences. The court did not examine the fact that the 
donation was not intended to serve as an actual donation. Charitable donations have 
a long history of masking money laundering, corruption, and bribery.91 The court’s 
acceptance of the company’s effort to further business motives in a foreign country 
leaves the f loodgates wide open for transactions that potentially violate duties and 
86. See Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *18.
87. See In re Lernout & Hauspice Sec. Litig. v. Lernout, 230 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165–68 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(finding that an informal inquiry by the SEC was a red f lag supporting plaintiffs’ claims); In re Oxford 
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 290, 293, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that an 
investigation by the New York Attorney General was a red f lag supporting plaintiffs’ complaint); In re 
Health Mgmt. Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that an SEC inquiry 
constituted one of multiple important red f lags).
88. See In re Lernout, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 165; In re Oxford, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 295; In re Health Mgmt., 970 
F. Supp. at 203. 
89. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *8 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 13, 2014).
90. Id.
91. See Reagan R. Demas, Biting the Hands That Feed: Corporate Charity and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 29 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 335 (2014).
278
Louisiana MunicipaL poLice eMpLoyees’ RetiReMent systeM v. Wynn NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 | 2015/16
statutes—so long as an underlying motive tied to profits exists. Directors cannot be 
said to act in good faith when they pursue profits at the cost of wading into 
complicated regulatory territory because they run counter to the “long run interests 
of shareholders.”92 The court’s interpretation fails to consider the shareholders’ 
reasonable belief that the donation was not made in good faith because it was used to 
curry favor for the second land concession.
 In Massey, the court stated that pursuing profits at the expense of compliance 
with the law harmed the corporation and its shareholders by exposing them to legal 
costs, fines, and punishments.93 The Wynn decision resulted in “the cost of defending 
Wynn Resorts against government investigations and the penalties, fines and other 
liabilities and expenses associated with those investigations.”94 The court’s finding 
that a donation used to curry favor with a foreign government falls within the 
company’s best interest undermined the role of compliance in maintaining the 
integrity of an American business. The court’s analysis of the good faith element 
substantially weakened the shareholders’ ability to bring an action against directors 
for exposing the company to significant compliance risk.
 Second, the Wynn court set a precedent which drastically reduces the duty of 
directors to make decisions on an informed basis. The Wynn court ruled that the 
plaintiffs were unsuccessful in alleging that the directors failed to act on an informed 
basis for three reasons: (1) the plaintiffs did not allege that informative materials were 
readily available to board members; (2) other board members did not know about S. 
Wynn’s legal opinion; and (3) S. Wynn’s legal opinion supported the donation.95 The 
court’s reasoning, however, was flawed for three reasons: (1) if S. Wynn thought it 
reasonable to seek a legal opinion, then such material information was reasonably 
available to the other directors; (2) S. Wynn’s legal opinion should have been shared 
with the other directors regardless of its substance; and (3) the court should not have 
weighed the substance of the opinion against the plaintiffs’ complaint.
 S. Wynn likely thought it reasonable to seek a legal opinion because the gambling 
industry is not immune from strict treatment and examination by regulators96 and 
such opinion would likely help determine the board’s course of action. Corruption 
and bribery have long been entangled with the casino industry.97 With the persistent 
monitoring by various governmental regulators, 98 it is reasonable to expect that as a 
92. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et. al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 
Geo L.J. 629, 651 n.68 (2010) (quoting TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., C.A. Nos. 10427, 
10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)) (describing the duty that requires directors to 
attempt to “manage the corporation within the law, with due care and in a way intended to maximize 
the long run interests of shareholders”); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
93. In re Massey Energy Co., C.A. No. 5430–VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *20–21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011).
94. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *1.
95. See id. at *8–9. 
96. See Godinho, supra note 85, at 5–7.
97. See id. at 14–22.
98. See id.
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director, S. Wynn would seek a legal opinion which validates the transfer of money 
because of the regulatory requirements that follow casino operators.
 The board members’ approval of the donation without counsel constitutes a 
breach of duty because the FCPA requires companies to have a system in place to 
examine such a risk.99 A duty to act independently on an informed basis is instilled 
in every director.100 Delaware courts have repeatedly held that directors are required 
to act in an informed and deliberate manner.101 The Wynn court, however, only 
required informative material provided to the board to be considered.102 This standard 
is unacceptably low for directors and fails to adequately ref lect advancements in 
corporate governance reform that require greater diligence.
 While directors need not examine every minute detail of a transaction before its 
approval, seeking readily available counsel so they can become aware of the regulatory 
and compliance issues would fulfill directors’ obligations to corporations and 
shareholders. Today, interpretation and enforcement of the FCPA is so broad that it 
results in “the largest proportion of pre-trial agreements with government 
enforcement officials.”103 That the directors did not seek out S. Wynn’s legal opinion 
or any legal counsel for themselves should constitute a failure to act on an informed 
basis. Thus, the plaintiffs’ allegations should rebut the business judgment rule 
presumption as the board members’ failure to adequately inform themselves greatly 
harmed the corporation and its shareholders.
 S. Wynn’s legal opinion also should have been shared with the other directors at 
the time the transaction was approved regardless of its substance. The court weakened 
the fiduciary duty of care and oversight by stating that legal counsel was not necessary 
because it may not impact the rest of the board’s decision. The duty to act on an 
informed basis is purely a procedural mechanism.104 The business judgment rule 
protects misinformed, mistaken, or misguided decisions so long as directors seek 
information that is reasonably available.105 If judges continue to hold directors to 
differing standards, they will create an unclear fiduciary obligation and lead directors 
to rely on information that was not independently obtained in a deliberate manner.
 The court should also not have weighed the substance of the opinion against the 
plaintiffs’ complaint. The Wynn court erred in holding that “plaintiffs have not stated 
with sufficient particularity that seeking legal advice would have had an impact on the 
99. Taylor, supra note 10, at 7 (“Given the breadth of the FCPA and its interpretation by the SEC, the DOJ 
and the courts, all U.S. companies conducting business internationally must create and implement 
compliance programs.”).
100. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 920 (Del. 2000).
101. Id. at 921; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
102. La. Mun. Police Emps’. Ret. Sys. v. Wynn, No. 2:12-CV-509 JCM (GWF), 2014 WL 994616, at *8 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 13, 2014).
103. Taylor, supra note 10, at 8. 
104. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
105. See id. at 259.
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board’s decision to approve the Macau donation.”106 The court’s accounting for the 
substance of S. Wynn’s opinion cuts against the duty of directors to be informed and 
goes against precedent107 and the intention of the business judgment rule 
presumption.108 Directors have a duty to become informed whether such information 
proves fruitful or not.109 S. Wynn had an obligation to share the legal opinion 
regardless of its effect on the board’s decisionmaking. Taking into account the 
opinion’s substance runs contrary to the interests of the business judgment rule 
presumption and restricts shareholders’ ability to hold directors accountable. The 
court’s ruling would require shareholders to prove at the pleading stage not only that 
the directors failed to properly inform themselves, but also that the information 
obtained would prove the plaintiff ’s allegations and rebut the business judgment rule 
presumption.
 Considering the damning effect of compliance violations in modern business 
practice and the regulatory scrutiny of the gambling industry, the court should have 
held the plaintiffs to a more equitable pleading standard. In line with advancements 
in corporate governance reform, Wynn should have stood for the proposition that a 
director cannot act on an informed basis without properly examining compliance 
risk. Instead, the court created a precedent that will drastically reduce the duty of 
directors to act on an informed basis.
 Courts have increased the burden on plaintiff-shareholders to avoid wading 
unnecessarily into the boardroom and to curb frivolous lawsuits that might disturb 
everyday business matters.110 However, the District Court of Nevada’s holding in Wynn 
entered new and perilous territory for shareholders that will have a chilling effect on 
cases of merit. Enforcement of the FCPA will continue to evolve, and demand-futility 
cases such as Wynn should encourage directors to understand their obligations and the 
risks associated with the FCPA.111 Corporations going abroad will surely continue to 
play an important role in developing the local communities in which they operate.112 
106. Wynn, 2014 WL 994616, at *9 (emphasis added). 
107. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“‘[S]ubstantive due care,’ . . . is foreign to the business judgment rule. 
Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments. We do not even decide if they are 
reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”).
108. See id.; Solash v. Telex Corp., Civil Action Nos. 9518, 9528, 9525, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7, at *21 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 19, 1988) (“Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, 
information, and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts . . . courts have long been reluctant to 
second-guess such decisions . . . .”).
109. See R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations and Business 
Organizations §4.19(A) n.1003 (2015).
110. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The theory 
here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope 
to win a judgment.”); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of 
Loyalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1769, 1777 (2007) (“Caremark duties are deliberately structured to make 
it extremely hard for plaintiffs to win.”).
111. Jara, supra note 62, at 243. 
112. Demas, supra note 91, at 336–37.
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Contributions such as the Macau donation in Wynn, however, clearly fall within FCPA 
liability and could continue to pose a threat to shareholders in a changing statutory 
landscape.113 Courts should not shy away from standing up for shareholders when a 
board wades dangerously into the murky waters of the FCPA.
 The Wynn court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Courts 
must properly evaluate board decisions that bear significant compliance risk in order 
to uphold the rights of shareholders. The Wynn court’s ruling will narrow the options 
available for shareholders to hold directors accountable because it places an 
unconscionable burden on plaintiffs seeking to rebut the business judgment rule 
presumption at the pleading stage. The Wynn court set a dangerous precedent by 
diminishing the critical role of compliance in advancing corporate governance and 
further steepening the hurdle for shareholders seeking to hold directors responsible 
for harmful actions that burden the corporation with significant compliance risk. 
113. See id. at 355.
